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Abstract 
The present study investigated the underlying process of moral decision making, 
by comparing two prominent theories, and factors that can moderate this. The dual 
process model suggests cognitive load will selectively reduce utilitarian inclinations (as 
both the decision and increased cognitive load use cognitive resources), whilst having 
no effect on deontological inclinations; the Social Intuitionist Model stipulates cognitive 
load will have no effect on either. The more people saved (for the same number killed; 
efficient ratio) the more utilitarian the response should be. Method: One hundred and 
sixty-six participants (125 females; aged 18-73 years, 40 males; aged 19 to 68, and one 
24-year-old who did not identify as either) were allocated into one of four conditions, 
manipulating both cognitive load and kill/save ratio (KSR). Participants remembered a 
digit string (easy or hard depending on condition) whilst answering a moral dilemma 
and then answered questions about the difficulty, of the questions and memory task, and 
some demographics. Results: Bayesian analysis provide some evidence in favour of the 
null hypothesis for an effect of cognitive load; thus, there is no effect – supporting the 
Social Intuitionist Model. There is definitive evidence suggesting there is an effect of 
KSR consistent with theory. Conclusion: Results suggest social and cultural influences 
determine one’s moral principles, and thus cognitive load will have no effect on the 
decision. KSR has an impact to an extent; however, some individual differences make it 
impossible to ever be utilitarian. Future research should look at more individual 
differences and populations to determine if findings are the same.  
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Introduction  
Consider the following: a train is out of control and will kill five people, you can 
save them if you switch the train lines – however in doing so you will kill one person; 
you must choose if switching the tracks is the moral thing to do (Thomson, 1985; 
Tinghog et al., 2016). Making moral decisions is a part of everyday life; however, 
people are often distracted or emotionally tied to the scenario and according to some 
theories, this may impact their response. Understanding the underlying processes and 
factors that shape moral decisions will alert us of potential biases and issues, and allow 
us to make informed decisions.  
Scenarios such as this cause dilemmas because they create conflict. This conflict 
is between two primary moral principles that influence moral decision making. The two 
principles are Utilitarianism and Deontology.  
Utilitarian decision making requires one to weigh the costs and benefits of a 
situation and make a decision that results in the best outcome for the greatest number of 
people (Mill; as cited in Conway & Gawronski, 2013). In the opening example, more 
specifically, the response is deemed utilitarian if the line is switched and one is killed to 
save five. The utilitarian response has been considered a reflective, logical approach, 
that requires greater cognitive resources than a deontological response (Green et al., 
2004; Tinghog et al., 2016). Utilitarian responses require extra cognitive resources 
because one needs to make a conscious decision after weighing up the costs and benefits 
of each possible action.  
A Deontological response follows the concept that an act itself can be immoral, 
(Kant; as cited in Conway & Gawronski, 2013). An act can be considered immoral even 
if it produces a utilitarian outcome. In the above example, although switching the tracks 
would result in fewer deaths, the decision-maker actively engages in an action that leads 
to the death of a person who would have otherwise survived; thus, the response would 
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be deemed deontological if the tracks were not switched.  This is considered an intuitive 
and emotional approach that requires fewer cognitive resources than utilitarian 
responses (Tinghog et al., 2016). Deontological responses require fewer cognitive 
resources because they are emotionally driven (Tinghog et al., 2016) and do not require 
deliberation of consequences. Some scenarios trigger a stronger emotional reaction, and 
therefore, a greater deontological response. These are often personal questions. Personal 
questions are those in which the question asks if the reader would personally harm or 
kill the target to save others. For instance, scenarios where the decision maker is asked 
to think about pushing someone in front of a train (Tinghog et al., 2016) or imitate 
cutting someone’s throat with a plastic knife (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey,, & Mendes, 
2012) (as opposed to pulling a lever), are considered personal, and elicit a greater 
emotional response (Greene et al., 2001). Using personal questions to elicit more 
emotional responses and thus create more internal conflict, allows one to measure the 
underlying processes more easily.  
The current research will investigate the effect of cognitive load on moral 
decisions. Cognitive load has become an integral part of moral decision-making 
research. Different theoretical frameworks suggest varying levels of cognitive resources 
are needed in the decision-making process. As a result, each theory predicts that 
cognitive load will have different effects on moral decisions. Cognitive load can be used 
in many forms, however the most commonly used are: divided attention, memory tasks, 
or time pressure. This is important not only from a theoretical perspective (we can 
extend research and provide further support for a particular theory), but also from a 
practical one because consequential moral decisions are made under cognitive load in 
many domains, including: political, military, and management settings. 
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Single Process Theories 
Some theories suggest moral decisions are driven by a single process (one 
process or area of the brain underpins the decision (Tinghog et al., 2016)). In earlier 
years of cognitive psychology, the predominant theory claimed that moral decision 
making relied solely on reasoning and higher order thinking (Kohlberg & Piaget; as 
cited in Haidt, 2001); this is referred to as rationalist (Haidt, 2001). This theory suggests 
moral decisions are driven by logic and reasoning (Tinghog et al., 2016) and therefore, 
should require more cognitive resources than an emotional/intuitive response. 
Rationalist theory suggests that logical reasoning determines moral decisions, and that 
there is no emotional component. This should result in people making utilitarian 
decisions all the time, even when under cognitive load. This can be considered an 
unlikely outcome, resulting in researchers developing and testing alternate theories.   
In more recent years, another single process theory has been studied and is well 
supported. The Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001) suggests that moral decision 
making is driven by automatic, effortless responses and is only followed by further 
processing to justify the immediate response (Haidt, 2001). This justification process 
can be tainted, however, by the confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998). The confirmation 
bias suggests that people will stop a search for information when they find some that 
supports their ideas or arguments (Nickerson, 1998). This is exacerbated when the 
information is regarding one’s moral beliefs (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). The Social 
Intuitionist Model justification phase suggests that one makes an intuitive decision 
based on internalised moral rules that were created by their society or culture. Haidt 
(2001) argues, however, that if a decision requires further reasoning it is most often 
achieved through social interaction, rather than internal reflection. Plebe (2015) 
suggested morality is learned through cultural practices and reinforced by emotions, 
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which too supports the model. This theory allows people to make either deontological 
or utilitarian decisions quickly and without using cognitive resources; therefore, 
differing responses to the same dilemma stem from personal differences. Personal 
differences are due to influences such as cultural practices and reinforcement history; 
these change the extent to which an individual’s intuitive response is based on utilitarian 
principles or deontological principles. A key piece of evidence that lead Haidt to 
develop the Social Intuitionist Model is that people have difficulty justifying their moral 
decisions, especially those that elicit strong emotions (Haidt, Bjorklund & Murphy, 
2000). Haidt et al. suggest this is due to the emotional process underlying moral 
decision making; as well as learned social and cultural rules.  
Dual Process Theories 
The most prominent theory in moral psychology is the dual-process theory 
(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). The theory postulates that when 
making a difficult moral decision two processes are triggered. The first is an emotional 
response, which aligns with deontological principles. The secondary process is a 
cognitive judgement about the consequences of a decision, aligning with utilitarian 
principles. These are thought to occur in this order; however, the second (cognitive) 
competes with the first. The theory was supported through further fMRI studies that 
showed, when people made utilitarian decisions, areas in their brain that control 
reasoning were activated, as well as emotional areas (Greene et al., 2004). Koenigs et al. 
(2007) showed that when the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) (used in emotion) 
is damaged, people make utilitarian responses to an abnormally large proportion of 
moral dilemmas. Furthermore, responses were compared to a group of people with 
general brain damage, which showed the VMPC, used in emotion, was influencing 
moral decision making rather than general damage (Koenigs et al., 2007). These 
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findings are in line with the dual process; if the VMPC is not intact, there is no 
emotional response, no competition between emotion and cognition and therefore the 
utilitarian response is most common. Additionally, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) 
hypothesised that if a moral dilemma caused minimal emotional anguish, the conflict 
between utilitarian and deontological responses would not be as great, and as such 
utilitarian responses would be more common. To test this, they induced positive 
emotions in participants by showing them a comedy skit for five minutes before asking 
them to answer moral dilemmas. Results confirmed their hypothesis; inducement of 
neutral emotion allowed the dilemma to cause natural levels of conflict, which lead to 
more deontological responses. In comparison, when the induced emotion was positive, 
there was less internal conflict and utilitarian decisions were more common (Valdesolo 
& DeSteno, 2006).  
According to dual process theories, cognitive load should affect moral decision 
making, specifically utilitarian responding. This is because the secondary process, used 
to make a utilitarian judgement, requires more cognitive resources to calculate costs and 
benefits. When under increased cognitive load, fewer resources are available for the 
decision-making process, resulting in the logical argument not being strong enough to 
override an emotionally-driven response. As a result, utilitarian decisions will be less 
likely when cognitive load is high; deontological decisions, however, should not be 
affected. Multiple studies have manipulated cognitive load to determine if a dual or 
single process model dictates moral decision making, however, results have been mixed 
(Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom & Cohen, 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; 
Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014; Tinghog et al, 2016). Greene, et al. (2008) reported that 
increase in cognitive load reduced the number of utilitarian judgements, whilst having 
no effect on deontological ones. They concluded this through research that asked 
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participants in the cognitive load condition to answer difficult moral dilemmas whilst 
reading aloud and simultaneously hitting a computer key every time a specific number 
crossed the screen; the control group only answered the dilemmas. Tinghog et al. (2016) 
completed a similar study, testing the dual-process model using cognitive load, 
however, their results showed no selective effect of cognitive load and concluded the 
results supported the Social Intuitionist model. Thus, results on the effect of cognitive 
load in moral decision making are mixed.  
Gürçay and Baron (2017) suggest that the above findings support an alternate 
version of the dual process model; a simultaneous one. Gürçay and Baron showed this 
by recording participant’s computer mouse path after reading a moral dilemma (similar 
to the ones used in the current study) and examining whether the path changed from 
making a deontological decision to a utilitarian decision. Results indicated that there 
was no significant difference between changing from deontological to utilitarian and 
changing from a utilitarian to a deontological response; however, a large proportion did 
make a change both ways (which may have been why there was no significant 
difference). Whilst both changing of response patterns occurred, they were caused by 
the specific dilemma (Gürçay & Baron, 2017). Koop (2013), whose experiment Gürçay 
and Baron loosely replicated, found the same results. Gürçay and Baron also showed 
that approximately five times the number of participants that did switch, did not change 
responses. This could be interpreted as the change happens sequentially or that there 
was no change at all, supporting the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2001).  
Recent Approaches to Understanding Moral Decision Making  
In recent years there have been several studies providing potential explanations 
for the discrepancies in regards to the effect of cognitive load on moral decisions. These 
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include varying the benefits of making a utilitarian decision and developing more 
sophisticated measures of deontology and utilitarianism.  
Kill/Save Ratio 
A study, by Trémolière and Bonnefon (2014), discovered a moderating factor on 
the effect of cognitive load; which they called the Kill/Save Ratio (KSR). Trémolière 
and Bonnefon (2014) suggested that if the number of people killed is far less than the 
number of people saved (e.g. 1 vs. 500) then the ratio is efficient, and people should be 
able to make a utilitarian decision with little to no cognitive resources. Trémolière and 
Bonnefon further suggested that if the number of people killed did not greatly differ to 
the number of people saved (e.g. 1 vs. 5) then the decision requires more cognitive 
effort. Therefore, when the ratio is efficient cognitive load should have no impact on 
utilitarian decision making. When the ratio is inefficient, however, utilitarian decision 
making will be harder (as the costs and benefits will be closer) and cognitive load will 
have a more pronounced effect on utilitarian responses. Neither an efficient nor 
inefficient KSR should affect deontological responses. To test this, Trémolière and 
Bonnefon asked participants to answer moral dilemmas where the KSR was 
manipulated with the number of people that would be saved varied from five to 500. 
Cognitive load was also manipulated. Trémolière and Bonnefon found that increasing 
the efficiency (still sacrificing the one to save more people) of KSR increased utilitarian 
responding. They also found that KSR moderated the effect of cognitive load. Under 
cognitive load; when the KSR was inefficient, utilitarian responding was lower. 
However, under cognitive load, when KSR was efficient utilitarian responding was 
greater. When time restrictions were added to the deliberation process, this effect 
became even larger.  
9 
 
 
 
Gürçay and Baron’s (2017) study: asking moral questions and watching mouse 
paths to determine if there was a sequential switch from deontological to utilitarian 
responding, also manipulated the KSR. Gürçay and Baron varied the KSR each 
question, so participants were presented with an array of efficiencies (kill one to save: 
100, 25075, 50050, 75025, 100000). Their results showed that as the ratio became more 
efficient (saving more people for the same one death), participants’ responses became 
more utilitarian; this lead to a small effect. Trémolière and Bonnefon found a larger 
effect of KSR than Gürçay and Baron. This may be due to the fact they only tested two 
extreme KSRs, rather than presenting a varying range of ratios with a single 
presentation, as done by Gürçay and Baron (2017).  
One limitation with Trémolière and Bonnefon’s (2014) experiments was the way 
they measured utilitarian responding. They manipulated KSR within-subjects, and only 
analysed data points where a participant made a different response to the efficient than 
they did in the inefficient ratio version of a dilemma (and vice versa). This may have led 
to an overestimation of the effects of KSR on utilitarian responding (because cases 
where KSR did not affect decisions were omitted), and a potentially misleading result 
regarding the interaction between KSR and load. 
Process Dissociation Measures of Utilitarian and Deontological Principles.  
Another big advance in the study of moral decision making was achieved by Conway 
and Gawronski (2013). They utilised Jacoby’s (1991) Process Dissociation (PD) 
procedure and applied it to decision making (normally used in perception, memory, and 
thought etc.). This allowed them to measure the extent to which moral decisions were 
driven by utilitarianism or deontology; the procedure produces an inclination of both 
principles, for an individual. Conway and Gawronski note that traditional measures pit 
deontological and utilitarian decisions against each other, measuring responses as only 
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utilitarian or deontological, as if they were inversely related (i.e. if a participant 
responds mostly in a utilitarian manner, they may be classified utilitarian even though 
they answered some deontologically), which can distort results and lead to ambiguity. 
This means researchers cannot tell if manipulations are increasing one type of response 
or decreasing the other (Conway & Gawronski, 2013); and could be the reason studied 
effects of cognitive load are contradictory. 
PD requires the decision maker to read two versions of a scenario; incongruent 
and congruent. Incongruent scenarios are those which are commonly used in moral 
decision-making research, such as the train problem described in the opening paragraph. 
These inherently create a conflict between utilitarian and deontological principles. One 
response would be acceptable by utilitarian standards (pulling the switch to change the 
train lines, saving five and killing one) whilst the other is not; but is acceptable by 
deontological standards (not touching the switch and letting five die, but not killing 
any). Congruent scenarios differ as they do not create conflict between the two 
principles; that is – one (yes/no) response is acceptable by both principles and the other 
is unacceptable by both principles. For example, “You are driving through a busy city 
street when all of a sudden a young mother carrying a child trips and falls into the path 
of your vehicle. You are going too fast to brake in time; your only hope is to swerve out 
of the way. Unfortunately, the only place you can swerve is currently occupied by a 
group of children on their way to elementary school. If you swerve to avoid the young 
mother and baby, you will kill all of them. Is it morally acceptable to swerve and hit the 
schoolchildren in order to avoid the young mother and child?” In this example, taking 
action would be unacceptable for both principles (see appendix C for all questions).  
From these scenarios, Conway and Gawronski (2013) were able to deduce 
inclinations of utilitarianism and deontology, using the following equations (where: U is 
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a utilitarian inclination and D is a deontological inclination; c denotes congruent 
questions and i denotes incongruent questions; u denotes the number of utilitarian 
responses and d denotes the number of deontological questions, as shown in Figure 1.).  
 
𝑈 = 𝑝(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒|𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 𝑝(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
= (𝑢𝑐 + [(1 − 𝑢𝑐) ∗ 𝑑𝑐]) − ((1 − 𝑢𝑖) ∗ 𝑑𝑖) 
𝐷 = 𝑝(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡)/ (1 − 𝑈) 
= ((1 − 𝑢𝑖) ∗ 𝑑𝑖)/(1 − 𝑈)  
 
Figure 1. Flow chart of processing adapted from Conway and Gawronski (2013) 
 (2013). Yes and no, are responses to moral dilemmas, see appendix C (“is it 
morally acceptable to do kill/harm x to save y?”). 
The first equation deduces the probability of a utilitarian response based on all 
responses (see Figure 1.), and the second deduces the probability of a deontological 
response from the remaining responses, not accounted for by utilitarian inclinations. 
There is a proportion not accounted for by either (1-D). The resulting inclinations 
allowed Conway and Gawronski to analyse the effect of cognitive load on both 
inclinations for each individual. Results showed cognitive load reduces utilitarian 
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inclinations whilst having no effect on deontological inclinations, providing strong 
support for the dual-process model. 
Sex Differences and Moral Decision Making 
The effect of sex on moral decision making has been contested for many years. 
Tinghog et al., (2016) showed that males were more utilitarian in their responses to 
moral dilemmas, whilst women were more deontological. They suggest this may be due 
to different cognitive processes between men and women. Ward and King (2018) 
furthered this argument and suggested that women are more likely to make decisions 
based on emotion; thus, leading to greater deontological responses. They showed 
emotion was a key influence on moral decision making by asking women to answer 
moral dilemmas as unemotionally as possible and comparing this to a group of females 
and a group of males who had no instructions. Their study showed women who were 
answering unemotionally did not respond significantly differently to the group of males 
but did to the control group of females (Ward & King, 2018). 
The Current Study 
Our current study has two main aims, and one secondary aim. The first is to use 
the PD approach to investigate how the effect of cognitive load on moral decisions 
varies with KSR. Trémolière and Bonnefon (2014) found that the effect of cognitive 
load on utilitarian responding was reduced when the KSR was efficient (i.e. sacrificing 
one to save a large number of others). However, Trémolière and Bonnefon used the 
traditional method of measuring utilitarian responses; using the PD approach will 
provide a more accurate test of their theory. Hypothesis 1: In line with the dual process 
model, we expect that KSR will moderate the effect of cognitive load on utilitarian 
inclinations. We expect that high cognitive load will reduce utilitarian decision making 
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and there will be a weaker to null effect of cognitive load when the KSR is efficient. It 
is also expected there will be no effect of cognitive load on deontological inclinations.  
The second aim is to test whether KSR affects the extent to which moral 
decisions are driven by deontological inclinations. Several models predict deontological 
responding will be affected by various factors such as emotional and instinctual 
reactions (e.g. personal problems). However, no theories make predictions about the 
effect of KSR on deontological inclinations. Hypothesis 2: We did not make specific 
predictions about the effects of KSR on deontological responses. but treated this as 
exploratory research. 
Our secondary aim was to provide further evidence for the effect of sex on 
utilitarian decision-making, using the PD approach. Hypothesis 3: We expect males to 
have greater utilitarian inclinations than females.   
Method 
Design  
Only one study has investigated the effect of cognitive load on PD measures of 
utilitarian and deontological responses to moral dilemmas (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013). This study included approximately 30 participants per cell of their between-
subjects design. The results showed a moderate to large effect of cognitive load on 
utilitarian responding. In the context of these findings, we conducted a power analysis 
to estimate the sample size required to detect a moderate size effect (Cohen’s f = .36; 
converted from the partial eta squared value reported in Conway & Gawronski, 2013), 
with power of 0.8. This analysis yielded a suggested sample size of 135 participants, 
which we treated as a desired minimum sample size. 
The experiment used a 2x2 between-subjects, factorial design. The independent 
variables were cognitive load (high and low) and kill/save ratio (efficient and 
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inefficient). The dependent variables were a measurement of deontological and 
utilitarian inclinations, derived from the congruent and incongruent problems, using the 
PD approach.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited via posts on Facebook and SONA. Participants were 
randomly allocated into one of four groups. Eligibility requirements were that 
participants were at least 18 years of age. Three hundred participants were recruited. 
One hundred and thirty-four participants’ data was removed. Not finishing the study 
lead to 125 being removed. Failing to respond appropriately (i.e. not make an attempt) 
to six, or more, digit string replications resulted in eight participants’ data being 
removed. We counted the number of “blank” (or not appropriate) responses per 
participant and tested different cut offs. This did not make much difference to how 
many participants were omitted so we used six blanks (one third of responses) as our 
omission criteria. One person was removed as they admitted to giving up in the memory 
task replication section. The remaining 166 participants were aged 18-73 (M=33.5, 
SD=12.9); 125 females aged 18 to 73 (M=33.3, SD=12.4) and 40 males aged 19 to 68 
(M=34.5, SD=14.4), and one 24-year-old who did not identify as female or male. 
Materials 
Moral problems 
Participants answered 18 moral questions, presented in a random order (9 base 
questions with a congruent and incongruent version). Questions were adapted, from 
studies by Conway and Garwonski (2013) and Trémolière and Bonnefon (2014), so 
kill/save ratios and congruence could be implemented, respectively. The questions were 
selected based on their manipulability. All questions were changed to first person, to 
create questions where the decision-maker was asked to consider themselves in the 
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scenario as the person faced with the dilemma. All questions were framed in the first 
person. The literature shows a well evidenced difference in responding, such that 
problems framed in the first person rather than the third person (sometimes termed 
“personal” problems) elicit more conflict between utilitarian and deontological 
principles and tend to promote a stronger influence of deontological principles (e.g., 
Greene et al., 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007). However, we chose not to manipulate the 
personal framing of problems because our focus was on the effect of cognitive load and 
KSR on moral decisions. 
Of the eight incongruent moral dilemma scenarios, two involved situations 
where the decision-maker (i.e., the participant) was also faced with death if he or she 
deemed the action unacceptable (i.e. responded in a deontological way and chose not to 
act). For example, the participant might be asked to imagine themselves as one of many 
passengers on an overcrowded lifeboat, and asked whether it is acceptable to throw one 
person out of a life boat to prevent it sinking (Tinghog et al. 2016). People are likely to 
make more utilitarian decisions in these types of scenarios (due to self-preservation) 
than ones where the decision-maker is not faced with death if he or she deems the action 
unacceptable. We did not have an a-priori reason to expect that the effects of cognitive 
load or KSR would vary systematically with this aspect of the dilemmas, and thus did 
not treat it as a manipulation.  
The eight moral questions adapted from Conway and Garwonski’s study 
involved worded quantities (e.g. A few, many, hundreds), as opposed to Trémolière and 
Bonnefon’s ten questions, that utilised integers (e.g. 5, 500). We kept this format for 
three purposes: not to distort the wording of the Conway and Garwonski’s questions, 
mitigate any effects that may arise from using subjective (several, many) quantities, and 
to minimise the effect of using a memory task with numbers - Gürçay and Baron (2017) 
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note that if the cognitive load manipulation involves integers, it may reduce attention to 
that particular dimension (number of lives saved/lost) in the moral question.  
Half of the questions asked participants if it was appropriate to kill someone in 
order to save others, whilst the remainder asked whether or not it was morally 
acceptable. As these ultimately ask the same thing, to keep all problems consistent, half 
were changed so all asked if it were morally acceptable. See Appendix C for the 
questions.  
Cognitive load 
Previous studies, such as that by Greene et al. (2008), utilised a number search task as a 
way of dividing attention and, hence reducing the cognitive resources available for a 
moral dilemma task being completed at the same time. In such tasks participants are 
required to hit a button each time they see the number “5” appear in a string of numbers 
running across the bottom of the screen; they are told their accuracy will be recorded. 
For the current study we utilised a common memory task to manipulate cognitive load 
(variations of this task have often been used in prior research; e.g. Conway & 
Garwonski, 2013; DeShon, Brown, & Greenis,1996; Tinghog et al, 2016). Before 
viewing each moral dilemma, participants viewed a new digit string. The high cognitive 
load group viewed a randomly generated 7-digit string, that included: numbers (0 to 9), 
lower case and capital letters (a to z and A to Z) and symbols (those on a QWERTY 
keyboard, e.g. R#6diL!), for 10 seconds. The low cognitive load condition viewed 
strings that had 3 digits and only including numbers and letters (e.g. 123); for 10 
seconds. Although some previous studies (DeShon et al., 1996) have minimised the 
time allowed for memorising for the low cognitive load condition, we held this constant 
to reduce the possibility that a time limit might inadvertently add extra cognitive load in 
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the low cognitive load conditions, thereby weakening the experimental manipulation 
(e.g. Tinghog et al, 2016).  
Manipulation Checks 
Cognitive load 
A space for replication of the digit string, to observe if the task was a cognitive priority 
(Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014), was presented after the Likert scale, mentioned above. 
A self-report measure of whether remembering the digit string used a lot of energy (yes 
or no) (Tinghog et al., 2016) followed each replication of the digit string. If the 
cognitive load manipulation was effective the measure would be answered ‘yes’ more 
often in the high cognitive load group than the low cognitive load group.  
Congruence and kill/save ratio 
A Likert scale measuring problem difficulty (Conway & Garwonski, 2013) was 
presented after a response to each question was made. The scale had 5 points rated from 
“very easy (1)” to “very hard (5)” (Conway & Garwonski, 2013). This was used to note 
if participants had noted the congruence of questions (we would expect congruent 
problems to be rated as easier than the incongruent questions) and KSR (we would 
expect those in the efficient KSR groups to rate the problems as easier than the 
inefficient KSR groups).  
Procedure 
All participants were initially lead to a site, using LimeSurvey software (Version 
2.06; Schmitz, 2015), that provided them with information about the study and required 
consent to move forward (see appendix A). Following this, they received instructions 
and a practice question with the exact format of the remainder of the study (see 
appendix D). A hyperlink directed them to the actual study, where they were randomly 
allocated into one of four groups: high cognitive load/inefficient KSR, low cognitive 
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load/ inefficient KSR, high cognitive load/ efficient KSR, low cognitive load/ efficient 
KSR.  
 Participants were asked not to use methods other than their memory to 
remember digit strings. They were then presented with either a hard (high cognitive 
load) or easy digit string (low cognitive load), depending on their allocated group; for 
10 seconds. They were told they would be asked to recall the digit later. Participants 
could not move forward in the study until the 10 seconds had elapsed.  
After the allocated time they were shown a moral question and asked to respond 
(by checking yes or no) to the moral acceptableness of the proposed action. cognitive 
load and KSR remained consistent for each participant and only varied between groups. 
After responding to the moral question, participants were asked: how difficult the 
question was to answer (1 = very easy, to 5 = very hard), then to recall the digit string, 
and finally, if remembering the digit string used a lot of energy (yes/no); in that order. 
This pattern was continued until all eighteen questions were answered. Participants 
were asked to provide demographic information (sex, age, English speaking). 
Participants were thanked for their time and invited to enter the draw to win one of six 
$50 vouchers or receive 30 minutes of course credit (for psychology students). See 
appendix D for a further detail of the instructions, wording and layout.   
Analysis 
We conducted a 2x2 Bayesian factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA), to 
measure the effect of cognitive load and kill/save ratio on utilitarian and deontological 
inclinations. A Bayesian ANOVA provides a Bayes factor (BF), which is a value a that 
is used to compare theories (Rouder, Morey, Speckmanc & Province, 2012). The BF 
provides a way of collating evidence for the null hypothesis, something null hypothesis 
significance testing does (Rouder et al., 2012). A Bayesian ANOVA was used in the 
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current study to provide support for the null hypothesis (and our alternate theory), if null 
results were found; something other studies have failed to do.  
Results 
According to criteria by Kass and Raftery (1995) a BF of 3.2 or greater is 
substantial evidence that the data support one hypothesis over the other (10 – 100 is 
strong and > 100 is decisive). Jeffreys (1961) suggests similar: BF > 3 is some evidence, 
> 10 is strong evidence and > 30 is classified as very strong evidence. A BF01 provides 
evidence in support of the null and a BF10 (1/ BF01) provides evidence for the alternate 
hypothesis.  
Manipulation checks 
Cognitive load 
Replication of the digit string was used as a removal criterion. Participants were 
removed if they admitted to giving up trying to remember the digit string or leaving 
more than 6 (one third) of the digit recall sections blank/entering random words or 
symbols (e.g. no idea, ????, *, Jeremy).  
The data show definitive evidence that the cognitive load manipulation was 
effective and had an impact on participants rating of whether or not remembering it used 
much energy, BF10 = 2.76e
35. The proportion of responses stating that remembering the 
digit string used a lot of energy was greater in the high cognitive load condition (M = 
85.14, SD = 14.32) than in the low cognitive load condition (M = 29.34, SD = 24.85).  
Congruence and kill/save ratio 
The average proportion of “yes” responses to congruent moral questions (yes, it is 
acceptable to kill someone to save no-one) was lower (10.44%), than the average 
proportion of “yes” responses, to the incongruent problems (yes, it is acceptable to kill 
someone to save few or many) (48.26%), BF10 = 4.61e
33. The BF provides definitive 
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evidence that the data support the alternate hypothesis, and confirms people noted 
congruence.  
There was definitive evidence of a difference between difficulty ratings for 
congruent and incongruent questions BF10 = 2.75e
23. Average difficulty scores for the 
congruent questions (M = 2.47, SD = 0.76) were lower than those for incongruent 
questions (M = 3.18, SD = 0.88). These means suggest people scored congruent 
problems as easy to answer and rated incongruent ones as hard to answer, showing 
people noted congruence. 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that KSR has no effect on ratings of 
problem difficulty, BF01 = 5.84. Difficulty ratings were almost the same in the 
inefficient group (M = 2.81, SD = 0.79) and the efficient group (M = 2.83, SD = 0.70).  
Overall, our manipulation check analyses indicate that the manipulations of 
cognitive load and KSR were effective, and that participants found it subjectively more 
difficult to respond to congruent problems than congruent ones. 
Utilitarian (U) and Deontological (D) Inclinations 
Data was analysed to see if it met the assumptions for an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA); normal distribution, no outliers, homogeneity of variance, and linearity of a 
residual plot. There was some skew in the distribution, however was not deemed severe 
enough to prevent running the analysis. Outliers were removed during the data cleaning 
phase; all other assumptions were met.  
A 2 (cognitive load) x 2 (KSR) Bayesian ANOVA, with utilitarian inclinations 
as the dependent measure, yielded a best fitting model that included: a main effect of 
KSR, no main effect of cognitive load, and no interaction. This model is approximately 
four times stronger at fitting the data than the model that included the interaction. There 
was definitive evidence suggesting an effect of KSR on utilitarian responding, B10 = 
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1203.25; where utilitarian responses were lower (M = 0.46, SD = 0.31) when KSR was 
inefficient, compared to efficient (M = 0.66, SD = 0.28).  
There is no evidence suggesting that cognitive load affected utilitarian 
inclinations. Collapsed across levels of KSR the mean utilitarian inclination for high 
cognitive load was 0.60 (SD = 0.27) and was 0.54 (SD = 0.34) for the low cognitive 
load group. The BF suggests some evidence in favour of the null hypothesis, rather than 
ambiguous evidence (Jeffreys, 1961), B01 = 3.10. There was no interaction between 
cognitive load and KSR. 
 
Figure 2. Effects of cognitive load and KSR on utilitarian inclinations. Error bars 
denote standard error. 
A second 2 (cognitive load) x 2 (KSR) Bayesian ANOVA, with deontological 
inclinations as the dependent measure, yielded a best fitting model that included: a main 
effect of KSR, no main effect of cognitive load, and no interaction. This model is 
approximately four and a half times stronger at fitting the data than the model that 
included the interaction. There was sufficient evidence (Kass & Raffety, 1995) of an 
effect of KSR on deontological responding, B10 = 5.40; where deontological responses 
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were higher (M = 0.80, SD = 0.29) when KSR was inefficient, compared to efficient (M 
= 0.66, SD = 0.38).  
There is no evidence suggesting that cognitive load affected deontological inclinations. 
Collapsed across levels of KSR the mean deontological inclinations for high cognitive 
load was 0.73 (SD = 0.34) and was 0.72 (SD = 0.36) for the low cognitive load group. 
The BF suggests sufficient evidence in favour of the null hypothesis, rather than 
ambiguous evidence (Kass & Raffety, 1995), B01 = 5.89. There was no interaction 
between cognitive load and KSR
 
Figure 3. Effects of cognitive load and KSR on deontological inclinations. Error bars 
denote standard error. 
There was an effect of sex on utilitarian inclinations. As there was only one 
person who identified as neither male nor female, we assumed the difference was 
between males and females. Results show males were more utilitarian in their 
responding (M = 0.68, SD = 0.24) than females (M = 0.53, SD = 0.32), BF10 = 4.37. The 
BF shows sufficient evidence of this difference (Kass & Raffety, 1995). 
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Discussion 
The main motivation for this study was to use the PD procedure to better assess 
the effects of cognitive load on utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas under different 
levels of KSR. The results did not support the first hypothesis that cognitive load would 
reduce utilitarian responding, and that this effect would be greater when KSR was 
inefficient. Our results showed that there was no effect of cognitive load overall, and 
this did not vary between efficient and inefficient KSR.  
The manipulation check shows the memory task was successful at inducing 
cognitive load, as more people in the high cognitive load group rated remembering the 
digit string as requiring more effort, than in the low group. Therefore, an ineffective 
manipulation of cognitive load was not the reason for our null results. 
Based on either primary theory (dual process or Social Intuitionist Model) our 
results support the hypothesis that cognitive load will have no effect on deontological 
inclinations. Although the best fitting model did not include an interaction, the pattern 
of means for utilitarian responding was also assessed to examine whether there was any 
evidence in support of the expected interaction. The pattern of results for the inefficient 
KSR conditions shows higher utilitarian responding in the high cognitive load group 
than in the low cognitive load group. This pattern is the opposite of what we would 
expect if the dual process model (Greene et al., 2004) was underpinning moral 
decisions; the dual-process model predicts that higher cognitive load will reduce 
utilitarian responding. However, these results can be explained by the Social Intuitionist 
Model (Haidt, 2001). According to the Social Intuitionist Model, the effects of cognitive 
load differ between individuals based on cultural and social influences, which can 
promote an intuitive tendency to respond either in a utilitarian or deontological way. 
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Thus, cognitive load can potentially decrease utilitarian responding, increase utilitarian 
responding, or have a null effect, depending on individual differences. 
As we used Bayesian analyses, we have shown that there is increasing evidence 
in favour of the null hypothesis (rather than just not supporting the alternate), and thus, 
the Social Intuitionist Model, which is a new addition to the research.  
We also found that KSR affected utilitarian decisions. This result was consistent 
with theory and previous findings (Trémolière & Bonnefon, 2014); when KSR was 
efficient, utilitarian decisions increased. Theory suggests this is due to an efficient KSR 
making utilitarian decisions easier to make. Our manipulation check for KSR, however, 
shows this may not be the underlying mechanism. Trémolière and Bonnefon (2014) 
suggest that KSR may not make the decision easier but make it harder to respond in a 
deontological way. Our manipulation check shows support for this theory: although 
KSR increased utilitarian responding, the decision was still rated as difficult. Although 
the manipulation check was conducted on all 18 questions, there remains no effect 
(BF01 = 5.39) when just using incongruent problems in the analysis (inefficient KSR: M 
= 3.21, SD = 0.90; efficient KSR: M = 3.15, SD = 0.86) This shows the congruent 
problems were not decreasing the difficulty ratings when averaged.  
Although our second hypothesis was exploratory, we were able to expand on 
current knowledge, by using the PD approach to explore the effect of KSR on 
deontological inclinations. We found that as the KSR became more inefficient, 
deontological responses increased. Recent research using manipulations, such as 
cognitive load, can affect utilitarian and deontological inclinations individually, and do 
not have to be viewed as causing a trade-off between the two types of principles 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013). What the current results suggest, is that KSR is one 
25 
 
 
 
external factor that does lead to a trade-off of principles; increasing the KSR efficiency 
increases utilitarian responding and reduces deontological responding.  
One possibility is that this effect could be caused by an inefficient KSR making 
the immoral act of killing someone more salient. This effect could be due to inefficient 
ratios making the scenario and hypothetical people more relevant and personable; thus, 
evoking more of an emotional state, leading to a deontological response (Sherman, 
Beike & Ryalls, 1999). When the ratio is efficient, however, the large number of people 
becomes a more abstract entity and the decision-maker loses the emotional connection; 
leading to logic driving the decision (i.e. a utilitarian response) (Sherman, et al., 1999). 
To test whether this is the case, future research could add a measure of emotional 
reactiveness, with the expectation that those in inefficient ratio groups, will have higher 
ratings of emotion than those in the efficient ratio groups.  
Our results also supported the third hypothesis, that males would respond in a 
more utilitarian fashion. They showed an effect of sex on inclinations, such that males 
were more utilitarian than females. This supports hypothesis and results found by 
Tinghog et al., (2016). The fact that women answered more emotionally (deontological) 
builds on the work of Ward and King (2018). 
The Social Intuitionist model may also play a role in determining the effect of 
KSR. Trémolière and Bonnefon (2014) found that even when they increased the KSR to 
1:5000, 40% of people still responded in a deontological way; that is, some people 
develop and hold very strong deontological principles that tend to drive moral decisions, 
even when the utilitarian consequences are very large. Baron, Gürçay, Moore, and 
Starcke (2012) suggest this is due to strong individual beliefs about deontology. This is 
in line with the Social Intuitionist model, that external factors do not greatly, or 
completely, impact some individual values, caused by society and culture. Our study 
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was able to provide a more accurate depiction of this by using the PD approach. The PD 
approach showed, similarly, that utilitarian inclinations did increase as the ratio became 
more efficient, however was still not 100% utilitarian. Trémolière, De Nays, & 
Bonnefon, 2012) discovered that utilitarian responses were lower for questions that lead 
to hypothetical death, compared with those that lead to harm. This could be another 
reason out utilitarian responses were not higher, especially in the efficient KSR groups.  
One main limitation to our study was that the sample was collected using first 
year university students and a snowball strategy, via sharing on Facebook (beginning 
with the student researcher and honours cohort). It is likely the sample was well 
educated and Australian dominant, due to the sampling method; however, this is 
unknown. This may have distorted results as cultural differences may not have been 
large. Many of the sample may have also had exposure to philosophy and the types of 
moral dilemmas used; thus, the sample is not greatly generalisable.  
Another issue with the sample was that it was predominantly female. Our results 
showed males were more utilitarian inclined, but due to the greater proportion of 
women the utilitarian inclinations may have been underestimated.  
Another limitation, that most moral decision-making studies face, is that 
people’s reasoning and judgement may work differently for hypothetical scenarios. 
Haidt (2001) suggests that people may not respond in a way they normally would as 
there is no motivation to be correct (i.e. not real lives on the line), nor is it necessary to 
justify why a response was made. Anonymity may have also contributed to these 
effects, as people may respond differently in real life; once there are restrictions of 
social pressures. To combat these, a stronger test could include using role play type 
scenarios, similar to those used by Cushman et al. (2012). What one might find is the 
effect of an efficient KSR on utilitarian responses may get smaller, as the emotional 
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response becomes more overwhelming (due to physically pretending to harm someone, 
compared with imagining it).  
Haidt (2001) also notes that the commonly used scenarios are unusual and non-
representative moral judgements. Although this is true, it is likely that most moral 
decisions are made the same way within an individual. Therefore, using scenarios such 
as the ones used in the current study can determine the underlying processes – which 
can then be extrapolated onto other moral decisions.  
Although the current results provide some evidence toward the null hypothesis, 
it should be noted that as only low and high cognitive load were used, and there may 
have been an effect between these and no cognitive load. Future studies should 
determine whether this is the case by using three cognitive load conditions (control, 
low, high). The finding that a KSR of 1:500 does not induce complete utilitarian 
inclinations could be caused by the current study only measuring two KSRs (1:5 and 
1:500). Future research should use the PD to determine when or if there is a KSR where 
utilitarian inclinations near 1; or if there will always be a discrepancy caused by 
individual differences. The three proposed cognitive load conditions should be tested 
alongside the four KSR ratios used in Trémolière and Bonnefon’s (2014) third 
experiment; to determine if there is a cognitive load or ratio where an interaction 
between the two becomes apparent.  
From an applied perspective, the finding that cognitive load does not selectively 
affect one decision making strategy is good news for the public, especially those 
making moral decisions in high stakes contexts. It means that no matter how much 
cognitive load people are under (divided attention, using memory, time pressure, etc.) 
when making moral decisions, they will respond the same way they would have if not 
under cognitive load. Consequences of this, however, are that an individual’s social and 
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cultural upbringing will determine their responses. For people in high power positions, 
such as army generals or a judge, this is most important and may need to be screened 
for; or taken into consideration. It is also important for this context to be aware that 
people may become more utilitarian when enough people will die otherwise (efficient 
KSR) and this could have negative impacts. Conversely, people may become more 
conservative and deontologically inclined as the KSR becomes more inefficient. Future 
research should aim to look at the effects of cognitive load and KSR in the above 
populations, as well as: criminals, different cultures, and including people from more 
diverse backgrounds (e.g. ranges of socioeconomic status) to determine if these are 
universal effects.  
However, as our results suggest individual differences play the greatest role in 
determining how people will respond, it might be beneficial to test the effect of 
cognitive load and KSR within one person. It may be possible that cognitive load has no 
effect due to the fact there is no universal, moral decision-making process. One may 
find an effect of cognitive load at an individual level (in line with the dual process 
model); such that those with utilitarian responding in the low cognitive load condition 
will make less utilitarian decisions in a high cognitive load condition, but those who 
respond deontologically in the low cognitive load condition would not see a change in 
responding.  
Potential moderating factors that were acknowledged in the method section in 
the current study, but not specifically tested, include whether the decision maker is the 
one that is required to kill/harm another, and whether the decision maker is at risk in the 
scenario. Future research should measure the effect of these factors by creating alternate 
versions of the moral problems; half where the decision maker is the protagonist and 
half not, and half where the decision maker also dies and half where they do not, 
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(similarly to the KSR and congruent versions) and comparing responses of each 
condition (within subjects). Testing the first moderating factor should lead to more 
deontological responding when the decision maker is the protagonist, as it should elicit 
more of an emotional response. The second moderating factor, whether the participant 
would also die if they do not sacrifice another, should lead to greater utilitarian 
responses and there should be less of an effect of KSR, as most people are likely to save 
their hypothetical self, no matter how many people die. Thus, the effects found in the 
current study may differ in scenarios where the participants would (hypothetically) die 
if they made a deontological choice.  
As most of the results support the idea that the biggest influences on moral 
decision making are personal differences and social and cultural upbringing, this can be 
used to design future studies. Gürçay and Baron (2017) note that pscyhopaths make 
utilitarian responses easier, due to the different wiring of their brains. To confirm if 
KSR manipulates levels of empathy (or something else emotional), a sample of 
psychopaths could be compared with control sample. If empathy was the determining 
factor of the effectiveness of KSR, it would be expected that psychopaths had increased 
utilitarian inclinations when the KSR is efficient, but there should be no effect of KSR 
on deontological inclinations (which should be consistently low). 
Overall, our manipulations were effective tests of our hypotheses. Results 
suggest social and cultural influences determine one’s moral principles, in line with the 
Social Intuitionist Model. Therefore, cognitive load will have no effect on one’s 
decision when the KSR is efficient or inefficient. Collapsed across levels of cognitive 
load, we found an efficient KSR increases utilitarian inclinations and reduces 
deontological inclinations; suggesting a trade-off. Future research should look at more 
individual differences and populations, to determine if these findings are the same. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Ethics approval letter 
 
Dear Dr Palmer 
Ethics Ref No: H0017588  
Project title: Moral decision-making study 
The above Minimal Risk application has been approved by the Chair of the 
Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee, on behalf of the full 
committee. Approval is for four years and conditional upon receipt of an annual 
Progress Report. Ethics approval for this project will lapse if a Progress Report is not 
submitted. 
A copy of the approval letter is attached for your records. 
The Ethics Committee wishes you all the best with the project. 
Kind regards 
Ailin Ding 
--  
Administration Officer Ethics 
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Appendix B: Information Sheet and Consent 
1. Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a Moral Decision-making study. This study is 
being conducted as part of Emily Reid’s Honours degree. Emily is a fourth-year student 
under the supervision of Psychology Senior Lecturers Dr. Matt Palmer and Dr. Jim 
Sauer. 
2. What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of this study is to investigate factors that influence how people 
make moral decisions. 
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in the study as you expressed an interest 
and you meet all eligibility requirements. Your participation is completely voluntary 
and there will be no negative consequences if you decide to withdraw. Your responses 
will be completely anonymous. Withdrawing will have no impact on your studies, 
results or your involvement with the university. You can withdraw at any point during 
this study. 
4. What will I be asked to do? 
You will be asked to read some hypothetical scenarios and answer some 
questions about the scenarios. Some of the scenarios involve moral dilemmas. For 
example, you may be asked whether it is acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life to save 
a group of other people. You will also be asked to provide some basic information about 
yourself (e.g., age, sex). The study will take around 30 minutes in total, completed in a 
single session. 
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Your participation in this study will not provide you with any direct benefits. 
However, this research will contribute to a greater understanding of how people make 
moral decisions. 
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no specific risks anticipated with participation in this study. However, 
in the unlikely event that you experience an emotional or personal response as a result 
of participation in this study, you can leave the study at any time. 
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
You are not required to complete this study once you start. You can withdraw at 
any time with no explanation. If you leave the website or your data is not complete, it 
will be deleted. If you change your mind after completing the study, we will not be able 
to re-identify your data and will not be able to remove it (because it will be stored in 
anonymous form). 
8. What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
Your data will be stored in a password protected folder on the UTAS 
Psychology network drive for at least five years after any publications (e.g., in academic 
journals) that involve the data. After this period, the data will be archived. Only the 
researchers associated with this project (including this study and other related studies) 
will have access to the raw data. All of your responses will be completely anonymous. 
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9. How will the results of the study be published? 
Results from the study will be used in Emily’s Honours thesis. Results from this 
study and other related studies will be submitted to an academic journal for publication. 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any queries or concerns about the research, please do not hesitate to 
contact Matt Palmer: matt.palmer@utas.edu.au or Jim Sauer jim.sauer@utas.edu.au 
“This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of 
this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
+61 3 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics 
reference number [H0017588].” 
If you click yes and continue you are giving your consent to participate in 
the study and for us to use your data. 
Yes/no 
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Appendix C: Moral Questions  
Efficient 
INCONGRUENT CONGRUENT 
Time Machine 01 
You find a time machine and travel back to the 
year 1920. While checking into a hotel, you meet 
a young Austrian artist and veteran of the First 
World War. You realize this is Adolf Hitler 
before his rise to power in Nazi Germany. He is 
staying in the hotel room next to yours and the 
doors are not locked. It would be easy to simply 
smother him with a pillow in his sleep and 
disappear, stopping the Second World War and 
the Nazi party before they even start. However, 
he has not committed any crimes yet and it seems 
wrong to hurt an innocent person. Is it morally 
acceptable for you to kill an innocent young 
Hitler in order to prevent the Second World War? 
Time Machine 02 
You find a time machine and travel back to the 
year 1920. While checking into a hotel, you meet 
a young man who later abducted multiple children 
and held them comfortably for a week until their 
families paid him some ransom money. He is 
staying in the hotel room next to yours and the 
doors are not locked. It would be easy to simply 
smother him with a pillow in his sleep and 
disappear, stopping the abduction and ransom 
demands before they even start. However, he has 
not committed any crimes yet and it seems wrong 
to hurt an innocent person. Is it morally 
acceptable for you to kill this man in order to 
prevent him from taking the children hostage?  
Car accident 03 
You are driving through a busy city street when 
all of a sudden a large mother’s group carrying 
their children walk into the path of your vehicle. 
You are going too fast to break in time; your only 
hope is to swerve out of the way. Unfortunately, 
the only place you can swerve is currently 
occupied by an old lady on their way to an 
elementary school excursion. If you swerve to 
avoid the young mother and baby, you will kill 
the old lady. Is it morally acceptable to swerve 
and hit the old lady in order to avoid the mothers 
and children?  
Car accident 04 
You are driving through a busy city street when 
all of a sudden a young mother carrying a child 
trips and falls into the path of your vehicle. You 
are going too fast to break in time; your only hope 
is to swerve out of the way. Unfortunately, the 
only place you can swerve is currently occupied 
by a class of children on their way to an 
elementary school excursion. If you swerve to 
avoid the young mother and baby, you will kill all 
of them. Is it morally acceptable to swerve and hit 
the schoolchildren in order to avoid the young 
mother and child?  
Torture 05 
You are a police officer, and have recently caught 
a criminal you have been hunting for some time. 
He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of 
explosive devices: some that have already gone 
off and some that have yet to detonate. He places 
explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go 
off at a time when many people are drinking 
coffee on the patios. In this manner, he has 
injured many people and might injure many more. 
Now that the criminal is in custody, you want to 
know where the unexploded bombs are so you 
can defuse them. He refuses to talk, so you decide 
to use “aggressive interrogation techniques” like 
holding his head under water and beating him. Is 
it morally acceptable for you to use “aggressive 
interrogation techniques” in order to find and 
defuse the unexploded bombs 
Torture 06 
You are a police officer, and have recently caught 
a criminal you have been hunting for some time. 
He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of 
paint bombs: some that have already gone off and 
some that have yet to detonate. He places paint 
bombs outside city cafes and sets them to go off 
at a time when many people are around. His 
explosives will spray nearby objects with paint. 
He has sprayed many cafes with paint and might 
spray many more. Now that the criminal is in 
custody, you want to know where the unexploded 
paint bombs are so you can defuse them and stop 
people being covered in paint. He refuses to talk, 
so you decide to use “aggressive interrogation 
techniques” like holding his head under water and 
beating him. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
use “aggressive interrogation techniques” in order 
to find and defuse the unexploded paint bombs? 
Border Crossing 07 Border Crossing 08 
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You are a soldier guarding a border checkpoint 
between your nation and one troubled by 
insurgent violence. You notice a young man in a 
cheap car approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face. You suspect he 
means to bomb the checkpoint, killing all the 
soldiers inside. He is rapidly approaching your 
station. Is it morally acceptable for you to shoot 
and kill the approaching man? 
You are a soldier guarding a border checkpoint 
between your nation and one troubled by 
insurgent violence. You notice a young man in a 
cheap car approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face. You suspect he 
means to cross the border in order to work 
illegally inside your country; earning a lot of 
money. He is rapidly approaching your station. Is 
it morally acceptable for you to shoot and kill the 
approaching man? 
Captive Soldier 09 
You are a military officer who was captured by 
the enemy with your 500 soldiers. One of your 
soldiers managed to escape and is now hiding. An 
enemy leader is looking for this soldier, and 
announces that he will kill the 500 soldiers if he 
does not find the missing soldier within 2 hr. You 
know where the soldier is hiding, and if you 
reveal where the soldier is, they will be killed 
instead. The only way for you to save the 500 
soldiers is to reveal where the soldier is. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to reveal where the 
soldier is to save the 500 captives? (Yes/No) 
Captive Soldier 10 
You are a military officer who was captured by 
the enemy with your 500 soldiers. One of your 
soldiers managed to escape and is now hiding. An 
enemy leader is looking for this soldier, and 
announces that he will hold the 500 soldiers 
captive for 2 days if he does not find the missing 
soldier within 2 hr. You know where the soldier is 
hiding, and if you reveal where they are, they will 
be killed. The only way for you to save your 
soldiers from being held captive is to reveal 
where the missing soldier is. Is it morally 
acceptable for you to reveal where the man is to 
stop 500 being held captive for 2 days? (Yes/No) 
 
Bomb11 
You work in a company that employs 500 people. 
One morning, a masked and armed man comes in 
the building and warns that he planted explosives 
in the building, and that the countdown has 
started. He turns to you and offers a deal: If you 
kill a random person on the street outside, the 
explosion will be cancelled. The only way for you 
to save 500 employees is to kill one at random. Is 
it morally acceptable for you to kill one at random 
to save 500 others? (Yes/No) 
Bomb 12 
You work in a company that employs 500 people. 
One morning, a masked man comes in the 
building and warns that he planted paint bombs in 
the building, and that the countdown has started. 
He turns to you and offers a deal: If you kill a 
random person on the street, the paint bombs will 
be cancelled. The only way for you to save 500 
employees from being covered in paint is to kill 
one at random. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
kill one at random to save 500 others? (Yes/No) 
Antibodies13 
You are an army doctor. After a massive attack 
from the enemy, 500 soldiers have been urgently 
transported in the military medical facility. They 
all need rare antibodies. Another soldier is also 
within the facility, who was put in an artificial 
coma a few days earlier. His life is not in danger. 
This soldier could be harvested for the antibodies 
that would save all the others. The only way for 
you to save the 500 soldiers is to harvest the 
antibodies of the other soldier, who will die in the 
process. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
harvest this soldier for antibodies and kill him in 
the process, to save the 500 other soldiers? 
(Yes/No) 
Antibodies14 
You are an army doctor. After a massive attack 
from the enemy, 500 soldiers have been urgently 
transported in the military medical facility. They 
all need rare antibodies. Another soldier is also 
within the facility, who was put in an artificial 
coma a few days earlier. His life is not in danger. 
This soldier could be harvested for the antibodies 
that would save all the others. Or you can order 
the antibodies from a lab; this will only take 
30mins longer. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
harvest this soldier for antibodies and kill him in 
the process, to save the 500 other soldiers 30mins 
faster? (Yes/No)  
Virus 15 Virus 16 
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You are in charge of a big pharmaceutical 
company. A terrible virus has spread in a part of 
the building where 500 people work. These 
people are now confined, and they will die if they 
do not get the proper antidote. Two chemical 
compounds were recently designed in the lab, one 
of which is the antidote, but you cannot tell which 
is which. There are two other men with you; both 
under your responsibility. The only way for you 
to save the 500 employees is to inject each 
compound into one of the men with you, killing 
one in the process. Is it morally acceptable for 
you to kill one of these men to save the 500 other 
employees? (Yes/No) 
You are in charge of a big pharmaceutical 
company. The flu virus has spread in a part of the 
building where 500 people work. These people 
are now confined, and they will get sick if they do 
not get the proper antidote. Two chemical 
compounds were recently designed in the lab, one 
of which is the antidote, but you cannot tell which 
is which. There are two other men with you; both 
under your responsibility. The only way for you 
to save the 500 employees from getting the flu is 
to inject each compound to one of the men with 
you, killing one in the process. Is it morally 
acceptable for you to kill one of these men to stop 
the 500 other employees getting sick? (Yes/No) 
Hacker17 
You are an army general. You are based in a 
building in which 500 other people work. One 
day, the alarm unexpectedly warns people that a 
missile is about to be launched. A hacker 
announces by radio that he can direct this missile 
at any time on the building where You and the 
500 other people are working. The hacker 
announces that if you accept to direct the missile 
yourself on the medical wing of the building, then 
you and the other 500 people will be saved. 
However, one person is working in the medical 
wing, and will be killed. The only way for you to 
save the 500 people is to direct the missile on the 
medical wing and kill the person who is working 
there. Is it morally acceptable for you to direct the 
missile on the medical wing and kill the person 
who is working there, to save 500 others? 
(Yes/No) 
 
Hacker18 
You are an army general. You are based in a 
building in which 500 other people work. One 
day, the alarm unexpectedly warns people that a 
missile is about to be launched. A hacker 
announces by radio that he can direct this missile 
at any time on a paddock nearby where you and 
the 500 other people are working. The hacker 
announces that if you accept to direct the missile 
yourself on the medical wing of the building, then 
the crops in the paddock will be saved. However, 
one person is working in the medical wing, and 
will be killed. The only way for you to save the 
crops is to direct the missile on the medical wing 
and kill the person who is working there. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to direct the missile on 
the medical wing and kill the person who is 
working there, to save the crops? (Yes/No) 
 
 
Inefficient 
INCONGRUENT CONGRUENT 
Time Machine 01 
You find a time machine and travel back to the 
year 1920. While checking into a hotel, you meet 
a woman. You realize this is a young Lawrence 
Scott Dame, a man who would go on to kill his 
sister’s family. He is staying in the hotel room 
next to yours and the doors are not locked. It 
would be easy to simply smother him with a 
pillow in his sleep and disappear, stopping the 
murder of an innocent family. However, he has 
not committed any crimes yet and it seems wrong 
to hurt an innocent person. Is it morally 
acceptable for you to kill an innocent young 
Time Machine 02 
You find a time machine and travel back to the 
year 1920. While checking into a hotel, you meet 
a young petty criminal. You realize this is George 
Brackman, a man who later on abducted a child 
and held her comfortably for a week until her 
family paid him some ransom money. He is 
staying in the hotel room next to yours and the 
doors are not locked. It would be easy to simply 
smother him with a pillow in his sleep and 
disappear, stopping the abduction and ransom 
demands before they even start. However, he has 
not committed any crimes yet and it seems wrong 
to hurt an innocent person. Is it morally 
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Lawrence in order to prevent the murder of an 
innocent family? 
acceptable for you to kill George Brackman in 
order to prevent him from taking a child hostage?  
Car accident 03 
You are driving through a busy city street when 
all of a sudden a young mother carrying a child 
trips and falls into the path of your vehicle. You 
are going too fast to break in time; your only hope 
is to swerve out of the way. Unfortunately, the 
only place you can swerve is currently occupied 
by a little old lady. If you swerve to avoid the 
young mother and baby, you will kill the old lady. 
Is it morally acceptable to swerve and hit the old 
lady in order to avoid the young mother and 
child? 
Car accident 04 
You are driving through a busy city street when 
all of a sudden a young mother carrying a child 
trips and falls into the path of your vehicle. You 
are going too fast to break in time; your only hope 
is to swerve out of the way. Unfortunately, the 
only place you can swerve is currently occupied 
by a group of children on their way to elementary 
school. If you swerve to avoid the young mother 
and baby, you will kill all of them. Is it morally 
acceptable to swerve and hit the schoolchildren in 
order to avoid the young mother and child?  
Torture 05 
You are a police officer, and have recently caught 
a criminal you have been hunting for some time. 
He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of 
explosive devices: some that have already gone 
off and some that have yet to detonate. He places 
explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go 
off late in the evening when very few people will 
be on the patios. He has not injured many people 
and may not injure any more. Now that the 
criminal is in custody, you want to know where 
the unexploded bombs are so you can defuse 
them. He refuses to talk, so you decide to use 
“aggressive interrogation techniques” like holding 
his head under water and beating him. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to use “aggressive 
interrogation techniques” in order to find and 
defuse the unexploded bombs 
Torture 06 
You are a police officer, and have recently caught 
a criminal you have been hunting for some time. 
He is allegedly responsible for rigging a series of 
explosive devices: some that have already gone 
off and some that have yet to detonate. He places 
explosives outside city cafes and sets them to go 
off at a time when very few people are around. 
His explosives will spray nearby objects with 
paint. He has sprayed few cafes with paint and 
may not spray any more. Now that the criminal is 
in custody, you want to know where the 
unexploded paint bombs are so you can defuse 
them. He refuses to talk, so you decide to use 
“aggressive interrogation techniques” like holding 
his head under water and beating him. Is it 
morally acceptable  for you to use “aggressive 
interrogation techniques” in order to find and 
defuse the unexploded paint bombs? 
Border Crossing 07 
You are a soldier guarding a border checkpoint 
between your nation and one troubled by 
insurgent violence. You notice a young man in a 
cheap car approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face. You suspect he 
means to bomb the checkpoint, killing a couple of 
guards outside. He is rapidly approaching your 
station. Is it morally acceptable for you to shoot 
and kill the approaching man? 
Border Crossing 08 
You are a soldier guarding a border checkpoint 
between your nation and one troubled by 
insurgent violence. You notice a young man in a 
cheap car approaching the checkpoint with a 
determined look on his face. You suspect he 
means to cross the border in order to live illegally 
inside your country. He is rapidly approaching 
your station. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
shoot and kill the approaching man? 
Captive Soldier 09 
You are a military officer who was captured by 
the enemy with your 5 soldiers. One of your 
soldiers managed to escape and is now hiding. An 
enemy leader is looking for this soldier, and 
announces that he will kill the 5 soldiers if he 
does not find the missing soldier within 2 hr. You 
know where the soldier is hiding, and if you 
reveal where the soldier is, they will be killed 
Captive Soldier 10 
You are a military officer who was captured by 
the enemy with your 5 soldiers. One of your 
soldiers managed to escape and is now hiding. An 
enemy leader is looking for this soldier, and 
announces that he will hold the 5 soldiers captive 
for 2 days if he does not find the missing soldier 
within 2 hr. You know where the soldier is 
hiding, and if you reveal where they are, they will 
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instead. The only way for you to save the 5 
soldiers is to reveal where the soldier is. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to reveal where the 
soldier is to save the 5 captives? (Yes/No) 
be killed. The only way for you to save your 
soldiers from being held captive is to reveal 
where the missing soldier is. Is it morally 
acceptable for you to reveal where the man is to 
stop 5 being held captive for 2 days? (Yes/No) 
 
 
Bomb 11 
You work in a company that employs 5 people. 
One morning, a masked and armed man comes in 
the building and warns that he planted explosives 
in the building, and that the countdown has 
started. He turns to you and offers a deal: If you 
kill a random person on the street outside, the 
explosion will be cancelled. The only way for you 
to save 5 employees is to kill one at random. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to kill one at random 
to save 5 others? (Yes/No) 
Bomb 12 
You work in a company that employs 5 people. 
One morning, a masked man comes in the 
building and warns that he planted paint bombs in 
the building, and that the countdown has started. 
He turns to you and offers a deal: If you kill a 
random person on the street, the paint bombs will 
be cancelled. The only way for you to save 5 
employees from being covered in paint is to kill 
one at random. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
kill one at random to save 5 others? (Yes/No) 
Antibodies 13 
You are an army doctor. After a massive attack 
from the enemy, 5 soldiers have been urgently 
transported in the military medical facility. They 
all need rare antibodies. Another soldier is also 
within the facility, who was put in an artificial 
coma a few days earlier. His life is not in danger. 
This soldier could be harvested for the antibodies 
that would save all the others. The only way for 
you to save the 5 soldiers is to harvest the 
antibodies of the other soldier, who will die in the 
process. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
harvest this soldier for antibodies and kill him in 
the process, to save the 5 other soldiers? (Yes/No) 
Antibodies 14 
You are an army doctor. After a massive attack 
from the enemy, 5 soldiers have been urgently 
transported in the military medical facility. They 
all need rare antibodies. Another soldier is also 
within the facility, who was put in an artificial 
coma a few days earlier. His life is not in danger. 
This soldier could be harvested for the antibodies 
that would save all the others. Or you can order 
the antibodies from a lab; this will only take 
30mins longer. Is it morally acceptable for you to 
harvest this soldier for antibodies and kill him in 
the process, to save the 5 other soldiers 30mins 
faster? (Yes/No)  
Virus 15 
You are in charge of a big pharmaceutical 
company. A terrible virus has spread in a part of 
the building where 5 people work. These people 
are now confined, and they will die if they do not 
get the proper antidote. Two chemical compounds 
were recently designed in the lab, one of which is 
the antidote, but you cannot tell which is which. 
There are two other men with you; both under 
your responsibility. The only way for you to save 
the 5 employees is to inject each compound into 
one of the men with you, killing one in the 
process. Is it morally acceptable for you to kill 
one of these men to save the 5 other employees? 
(Yes/No) 
Virus16 
You are in charge of a big pharmaceutical 
company. The flu virus has spread in a part of the 
building where 5 people work. These people are 
now confined, and they will get sick if they do not 
get the proper antidote. Two chemical compounds 
were recently designed in the lab, one of which is 
the antidote, but you cannot tell which is which. 
There are two other men with you; both under 
your responsibility. The only way for you to save 
the 5 employees from getting the flu is to inject 
each compound to one of the men with you, 
killing one in the process. Is it morally acceptable 
for you to kill one of these men to stop the 5 other 
employees getting sick? (Yes/No) 
Hacker 17 
You are an army general. You are based in a 
building in which 5 other people work. One day, 
the alarm unexpectedly warns people that a 
missile is about to be launched. A hacker 
Hacker 18 
You are an army general. You are based in a 
building in which 5 other people work. One day, 
the alarm unexpectedly warns people that a 
missile is about to be launched. A hacker 
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announces by radio that he can direct this missile 
at any time on the building where you and the 5 
other people are working. The hacker announces 
that if you accept to direct the missile yourself on 
the medical wing of the building, then you and 
the other 5 persons will be saved. However, one 
person is working in the medical wing, and will 
be killed. The only way for you to save the 5 
people is to direct the missile on the medical wing 
and kill the person who is working there. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to direct the missile on 
the medical wing and kill the person who is 
working there, to save 5 others? (Yes/No) 
 
announces by radio that he can direct this missile 
at any time on a paddock nearby where you and 
the 5 other people are working. The hacker 
announces that if you accept to direct the missile 
yourself on the medical wing of the building, then 
the crops in the paddock will be saved. However, 
one person is working in the medical wing, and 
will be killed. The only way for you to save the 
crops is to direct the missile on the medical wing 
and kill the person who is working there. Is it 
morally acceptable for you to direct the missile on 
the medical wing and kill the person who is 
working there, to save the crops? (Yes/No) 
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Appendix D: Screenshot Example of Study (LimeSurvey) 
 
